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Abstract 
This paper argues that the standard evidence 
for the knowledge norm of assertion can be 
extended to provide evidence for a 
corresponding knowledge norm of blame. 
 
 
1. According to the knowledge norm of assertion: 
 
KNA. One must: assert p only if one knows p.1  
 
Here are three data points that many of its advocates take to provide support for KNA: 
first, that assertions of lottery propositions – e.g. your ticket didn’t win the lottery – 
are impermissible, at least when based only on the probabilistic evidence against 
winning; second, that assertions of Moorean conjunctions – e.g. it is raining but I don’t 
know that it is raining – sound paradoxical; and, third, that assertions can be  
challenged by asking how/whether the speaker knows and criticised by pointing out 
that the speaker doesn’t know what they asserted.2  
                                               
1 For defences of KNA see e.g. Benton 2016, Hawthorne 2004, Kelp and Simion 2017, Slote 1979, Sosa 
2010, Turri 2016, Unger 1975, Williamson 2000. The above adopts Williamson’s (2000, 243) classic 
statement and to be interpreted accordingly as forbidding asserting what one does not know 
(alternatively permitting asserting only what one knows).  
2 These data points do not exhaust the evidence for KNA. Most importantly, one recent line of defence, 
spearheaded by John Turri, stems from experimental philosophy and has marshalled a range of 
empirical data in support of KNA (see Turri 2017 for a useful overview). In addition, one might wonder 
about the rationale for KNA, i.e. the question of why we should think KNA holds. One promising 
answer appeals to assertion’s function of transmitting knowledge to or generating knowledge in 
hearers (e.g. Turri 2017, Kelp 2018). Can a similar answer be given for why KNB holds? One reason for 
optimism is that the idea that blaming has an epistemic function is growing in popularity (Duff 1986, 
Fricker 2016, Sliwa 2019). That said, note that a negative answer does not mean a decisive strike against 
KNB. It might be that the rationale question doesn’t have a deep answer for either KNA or KNB, say 
because both are constitutive of the relevant speech acts in much the same way as rules of games are 
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2. The reason why these data points are taken to provide support for KNA is that KNA 
offers a very attractive explanation of all of them. First, one cannot know lottery 
propositions, at least not when the only evidence one has is probabilistic. By KNA, the 
relevant assertions of lottery propositions come out impermissible (Williamson 2000, 
Hawthorne 2004). 
Second, here’s what going on when one asserts a Moorean conjunction, 
according to KNA. When one asserts p, given that KNA holds, one gives one’s hearer 
to understand that one knows p.  However, when one asserts that one doesn’t know 
that p, one explicitly denies what one has given one’s hearer to understand by 
asserting p. No surprise, then, that these assertions sound paradoxical (cf. Moore 
1963).  
Third, norms that forbid one from ϕ-ing unless one satisfies condition C license 
criticisms of ϕ-ing by pointing out that one has ϕ-ed even though one doesn’t satisfy 
C (Kelp and Simion 2017).3 Since KNA forbids one from asserting p unless one knows 
that p, KNA predicts, correctly, that assertions can be criticised by pointing out that 
the speaker doesn’t know. Moreover, if norms that forbid one from ϕ-ing unless one 
satisfies condition C license criticisms of the sort just described, then it is only to be 
expected that they also license challenges by asking whether one satisfies C and how 
it is that one satisfies C, at least if there are various ways of satisfying C. In this way, 
KNA also predicts, again correctly, that assertions can be challenged by asking 
how/whether the speaker knows. 
3. The central thesis of this short paper is to argue that if these three data points do 
indeed provide support for KNA, then there is also support for what I will call the 
knowledge norm of blaming: 
 
                                               
constitutive of games (Williamson 2000). Alternatively, it might be that they afford different answers. 
Perhaps the reason why KNB holds has to do with minimising undeserved injustices for the recipients 
of blame. Having flagged these issues, I’d like to set them aside here. While both a thorough 
experimental approach to KNB and a full investigation of the rationale for KNB would be desirable, 
they are beyond the scope of this paper. 
3 Note that for Kelp and Simion there is an important difference between criticism and blame. In 
particular, to say that norm violations license criticisms is not to say that they licence blaming (see Kelp 
and Simion 2017 for more details). Note also that Kelp and Simion’s claim is not required to explain 
how KNA predicts that assertions can be challenged and criticised in terms of knowledge: Williamson 
(2000) offers an alternative that will do just as well for present purposes. 
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KNB. One must: blame X for ϕ-ing only if one knows that it was wrong for X4 
to ϕ.5  
 
Interestingly enough, if the above data points do indeed support KNA, there are 
parallel data points that serve to support KNB. Let’s start by looking at the data.  
4. First, blame based only probabilistic evidence is impermissible. If the only evidence 
that X impermissibly ϕ-ed is that Y has is that X is among the 999 out of a 1000 people 
who ϕ-ed impermissibly, Y cannot permissibly blame X for having ϕ-ed. Consider 
Cohen’s (1981) infamous ‘gatecrasher’ case in which 999 out of 1000 visitors climbed 
the fence of a certain rodeo, among them X and suppose Y utters the following:  
 
Y: “I blame you6 for gatecrashing the rodeo.” 
 
It is clear that Y does not permissibly blame X here.  
                                               
4 Can one permissibly blame someone for a suberogatory act? Note that if the answer is yes, KNB 
should be weakened accordingly:  
 
KNB*. One must: blame X for ϕ-ing only if one knows that it was wrong for X or bad of X to ϕ. 
 
5 Todd (2018) briefly touches upon a justification condition on blaming. Coates (2016) argues in more 
detail that blaming is governed by the following reasonable-to-believe norm: 
 
ENB. It is inappropriate (absent special justification) for A to blame B for x-ing if it is not 
reasonable for A to believe that B is morally responsible for x-ing. (2016, 458) 
 
Despite appearances to the contrary, Coates’s ENB is entirely compatible with KNB. This is because 
Coates explicitly remains neutral (i) on whether ENB is best stated in terms of ‘reasonable’, ‘justified’ 
or ‘warranted’ and (ii) on what it takes for a proposition to be reasonable for one to believe (Coates 
2016, 458, fn.4,5). Given the possibility of a knowledge first view according to which justification is 
knowledge (Littlejohn 2013, Sutton 2007, Williamson Forthcoming), it might be that one satisfies ENB 
if and only if one satisfies KNB.  
What’s more, there is reason to believe that Coates’ argument for ENB is congenial to the central 
claim of this paper. To see why, note that first that it rests on the parallel reasonable-to-believe norm of 
assertion: 
 
ENA. It is inappropriate (absent special justification) for A to assert that p if it is not reasonable 
for A to believe that p. (2016, 459) 
 
Second, if ENA is replaced by (or precisified as) KNA, Coates’s argument will have KNB as its 
conclusion. Coates’s argument, if sound, entails that if KNA is true, then so is KNB. 
6 X is the contextually determined referent of ‘you’ here.  
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Second, one can blame someone for ϕ-ing by saying “I blame you for ϕ-ing.”7 
But now note that uttering the following sounds paradoxical in just the same way as 
assertions of Moorean conjunctions do: “I blame X for ϕ-ing, but I don’t know that it 
was wrong of X to ϕ.” Consider: 
 
Y: “I blame you for gatecrashing the rodeo, but I don’t know that it was wrong 
of you to do so.” 
 
Y’s utterance sounds paradoxical in much the same way as assertions of Moorean 
conjunctions do.  
Third, Z can challenge Y for blaming X for ϕ-ing by asking how/whether Y 
knows that it was wrong for X to ϕ and criticise Y by pointing out that Y doesn’t know 
that X did anything wrong in ϕ-ing. Consider:  
 
Y: “I blame you for gatecrashing the rodeo.” 
Z-1: “How do you know that it was wrong for her to gatecrash the rodeo?” 
Z-2: “Do you know that it was wrong for her to gatecrash the rodeo?”  
Z-3: “You don’t know that it was wrong for her to gatecrash the rodeo.” 
 
In Z-1 and Z-2, Z’s contribution clearly constitutes a challenge of Y’s blaming and in 
Z-3 a criticism.  
5. Here is how KNB explains these data. In the gatecrasher case, Y only has 
probabilistic evidence that X entered the premises impermissibly and so doesn’t know 
that she did. Since permissible blaming requires knowledge of wrongdoing, Y does 
not blame X permissibly. 
Consider next the case in which Y blames X for ϕ-ing and adds that she doesn’t 
know that it was wrong for X to ϕ, e.g.: “I blame you for gatecrashing the rodeo, but I 
don’t know that it was wrong of you to do so.” Here’s what going on, according to 
KNB. When Y utters “I blame you for gatecrashing the rodeo”, given that KNB holds, 
Y gives her hearer to understand that Y knows that it was wrong for X to gatecrash 
the rodeo.  However, when Y adds “I don’t know that it was wrong for you to 
                                               
7 I am leaving open the question of whether performatives, like the above, are also assertions. See (Ginet 
1979) and (Bach 1975) for positive answers and (Austin 1962) as well as (Reimer 1995) for denials. Note, 
however, that it is hard to deny that one can blame someone indirectly without even making an 
assertion. Given the right contextual setup, ‘You’re jerk!’ is a case in point (Coates 2016) as is ‘You jerk!’ 
or ‘Could you be any more of a jerk?’. 
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gatecrash the rodeo”, she explicitly denies what she has given her hearer to 
understand earlier on. No surprise, then, that this utterance sounds paradoxical. 
Third, since norms that forbid one from ϕ-ing unless one satisfies condition C 
license criticisms of ϕ-ing by pointing out that one has ϕ-ed even though one doesn’t 
satisfy C, and since KNB forbids one from blaming someone for ϕ-ing unless one 
knows that it was wrong for said person to ϕ, KNB also predicts, again correctly, that 
blamings can be criticised by pointing out that the blamer doesn’t know that the 
person blamed did something wrong. Moreover, recall that if norms license criticisms 
of the sort just described, then it is only to be expected that one’s ϕ-ing can also be 
challenged by asking whether one satisfies C and how it is that one satisfies C, at least 
if there are various ways of satisfying C. As a result, KNB also predicts, again 
correctly, that blamings can be challenged by asking how/whether the speaker knows 
that it was wrong for the person blamed to ϕ. 
6. In sum, many of its champions take KNA to be supported by the three data points 
for assertion described above and the fact that KNA offers a very attractive 
explanation of them. What this paper has shown is that there are parallel data points 
for blame and that KNB offers an explanation of these data for blame that is no less 
attractive than the explanation KNA offers of the corresponding data for assertion. 
The moral of the story, then, is that if its champions are right and these data do provide 
evidence for KNA8, the same goes, mutatis mutandis for KNB.9 
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